


ORDER

06.06.2024 1. Learned counsel for the appellant present. Mr. Muhammad

Jan, District Attorney for the respondents present.

2. Vide our detailed judgment of today placed on file, it is held that as the departmental appeal and service appeal of the appellant are barred by time, therefore, this appeal is dismissed being not competent. Parties are left to bear their own costs. File be consigned to the record room.

3. *Pronounced in open court in Peshawar and given under our hands and seal of the Tribunal this 6th day of June, 2024.*



(MUHAMMAD AKBAR KHAN)
Member (E)


(RASHIDA BANO)
Member (J)

period prescribed under the relevant law. This Tribunal can enter into merits of the case only, when the appeal is within time. Supreme Court of Pakistan in its judgment reported as 1987 SCMR 92 has held that when an appeal is required to be dismissed on the ground of limitation, its merits need not to be discussed.

10. In view of the above discussion, it is held that as the departmental appeal and service appeal of the appellant are barred by time, therefore, this appeal is dismissed being not competent. Parties are left to bear their own costs. File be consigned to the record room.

11. *Pronounced in open court in Peshawar and given under our hands and seal of the Tribunal this 6th day of June, 2024.*


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Member (J)

7. Moreover, even void orders are required to be challenged within period of limitation provided by law. Supreme Court of Pakistan in its judgment reported as 2023 SCMR 866 has held as below:-

“6. Adverting to the arguments of learned ASC for the petitioner that there is no limitation against a void order, we find that in the first place, the learned ASC has not been able to demonstrate before us how the order of dismissal was a void order. In addition, this Court has repeatedly held that limitation would run even against a void order and an aggrieved party must approach the competent forum for redressal of his grievance within the period of limitation provided by law. This principle has consistently been upheld, affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court and is now a settled law on the subject. Reference in this regard may be made to Parvez Musharraf v. Nadeem Ahmed (Advocate) (PLD 2014 SC 585) where a 14 member Bench of this Court approved the said Rule. Reference in this regard may also be made to Muhammad Sharif v. MCB Bank Limited (2021 SCMR 1158) and Wajdad v. Provincial Government (2020 SCMR 2046). (Emphasis supplied)”

8. A perusal of record reveals that appellant was dismissed from service vide impugned order dated 04.06.2013 on the allegation of absence from duty with effect from 16.04.2013 without any leave/permission of the competent authority. Appellant challenged the order dated 02.04.2013 through filing of departmental appeal, which was rejected vide order dated 03.04.2017 being barred by time.

9. It is well settled that law favours the diligent and not the indolent. The appellant remained indolent and did not agitate the matter

before the departmental authority and the Service Tribunal within the

respective place of duty, where they were deputed and nature of duty assigned. Cases of those who remained willfully absent for few days will have to be looked differently from the one who remained absent for the years. Therefore, each and every case will have to be seen on its own merit. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that impugned orders were issued with retrospective effect and are void orders. Secondly, whether impugned order passed by the competent authority vide which the appellant has been discharged from service with retrospective effect is void ab-initio and no limitation would run against the same. In our humble view this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is misconceived. Though punishment could not be awarded with retrospective effect, however where a civil servant has been proceeded against departmentally on the ground of his absence from duty, then punishment could be awarded to him retrospectively from the date of his absence from duty and the same is an exception to the general rule that punishment could not be imposed with retrospective effect. Worthy, apex court in its judgment reported as 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1177 has observed as below:-

“8. We find that the impugned judgment has totally ignored the record and facts of this case. The department has also been totally negligent in pursuing this matter and has allowed the Respondent to remain absent from duty for so long. On the issue of retrospective effect, we find that admittedly, the respondent has been absent from duty w.e.f. 01.09.2003, hence no illegality is made out by considering his dismissal from there as he has not worked with the department since the given date. (Emphasis provided).”



2. Precise facts as gleaned from the record are that the appellant was enlisted as Constable in Police Department. Departmental proceedings were initiated against the appellant on the allegation that he while posted police lines Daggar, deliberately absented himself with effect from 14.04.2013. On conclusion of the inquiry, the appellant was awarded major penalty of removal from service from the date of his absence i.e 14.04.2013 vide impugned order dated 16.04.2013. The penalty so awarded to the appellant, was challenged by him through filing of departmental appeal (copy not attached), which was rejected vide order dated 03.04.2017 being time barred. The appellant filed the instant service appeal on 02.10.2018 for redressal of his grievance.

3. On receipt of the appeal and its admission to full hearing, the respondents were summoned. Respondents put appearance and contested the appeal by filing written reply raising therein numerous legal and factual objections. The defense setup was a total denial of the claim of the appellant.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned District Attorney for the respondents.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the facts and grounds detailed in the memo and grounds of the appeal while the learned District Attorney controverted the same by supporting the impugned order(s).

6. The first legal question is to decide that whether appellants are similarly placed person with those who were reinstated into service by department and this Tribunal or otherwise? In our humble view the nature of absence from duty of every Police Official is different from each other with respect to period of willful absence from duty from their



BEFORE THE KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA SERVICE TRIBUNAL AT CAMP
COURT SWAT

Service Appeal No. 1297/2018

BEFORE: MRS. RASHIDA BANO ... MEMBER (J)
MR. MUHAMMAD AKBAR KHAN... MEMBER (E)

Tariq Ali, Ex-Constable No. 766, District Buner.
... (Appellant)

VERSUS

1. The Regional Police Officer, Malakand, At Saidu Sharif Swat
2. District Police officer Buner.
... (Respondents)

Uzma Syed
Advocate ... For Appellant

Mr. Muhammad Jan
District Attorney ... For Respondents

Date of Institution.....02.10.2018
Date of Hearing.....06.06.2024
Date of Decision.....06.06.2024

JUDGMENT

RASHIDA BANO, MEMBER (J):The instant service appeal has been instituted under section 4 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Act 1974 with the prayer copied as below:

“That on acceptance of this appeal, the orders dated 04.06.2013 and 03.04.2017 may be set aside and the appellant may be reinstated with all back and consequential benefits. Any other Remedy which this august Tribunal deems fit and appropriate that may also be awarded in favor of appellant .”

