

KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA SERVICE TRIBUNAL,
PESHAWAR

BEFORE: **KALIM ARSHAD KHAN ...CHAIRMAN**
RASHIDA BANO ...MEMBER (Judicial)

Service Appeal No.7814/2021

Date of presentation of appeal.....26.11.2021
Dates of Hearing.....01.10.2024
Date of Decision.....01.10.2024

Jehanzeb Khan son of Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Junior Clerk,
Police Department, Peshawar.....(***Appellant***)

Versus

1. **Provincial Police Officer**, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar.
2. **Regional Police Officer**, Bannu Region, Bannu.....(***Respondents***)

Present:

Mr. Arbab Saiful Kamal, Advocate.....For the appellant
Mr. Muhammad Jan, District Attorney.....For respondents

**APPEAL UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KHYBER
PAKHTUNKHWA SERVICE TRIBUNAL ACT,
1974 AGAINST NOTIFICATION NO.2731-41/E-V
DATED 24.05.2018 OF RESPONDENT NO.1
WHEREBY APPELLANT WAS APPOINTED AS
JUNIOR CLERK FROM THE DATE HE REPORTS
FOR DUTY AT PLACE OF POSTING.**

JUDGMENT

KALIM ARSHAD KHAN CHAIRMAN: Appellant's case in brief, as per averment of appeal, is that he The appellant claimed appointment as Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) under the Deceased Sons Quota, following the death of his father during service on January 5, 2006; that submitted his application for this appointment on February 7, 2006; that the Writ Petition was filed, which reached the court on July 23, 2013; that the court directed the respondents to fulfill their commitment by appointing the

petitioner as Junior Clerk within one month; that on November 7, 2013, the appellant applied again for the Junior Clerk position under the same quota, but the department failed to comply; that a Contempt of Court (COC) was filed on January 15, 2014, leading to another court ruling on June 17, 2014, which reiterated the need for the petitioner to be accommodated as Junior Clerk promptly; that despite vacancies occurring on April 5, 2017, the appellant was allegedly overlooked; that a second COC was filed on December 19, 2017, prompting R. No. 01 to eventually issue a notification on May 24, 2018, appointing him as Junior Clerk; that on September 15, 2020, the appellant requested retroactive appointment effective either from the date of the original Writ Petition or from the court's judgment date of October 23, 2013; that despite a follow-up representation on November 15, 2021, there has been no response from the respondents, hence, the instant service appeal.

02. On receipt of the appeal and its admission to full hearing, the respondents were summoned. Respondents put appearance and contested the appeal by filing written reply raising therein numerous legal and factual objections. The defense setup was a total denial of the claim of the appellant.

03. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned District Attorney for the respondents.

04. The learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the facts and grounds detailed in the memo and grounds of the appeal while



the learned District Attorney controverted the same by supporting the impugned order(s).

05. Perusal of record shows that he was appointed vide Notification dated 24.05.2018 in pursuance of the directions of the Hon'ble Peshawar High Court, Peshawar. He moved an application for granting him seniority and promotion, on 15.09.2020 (after passage of more than two years and three months) while he has filed the instant service appeal on 26.11.2021 (after more than one year and two months thereafter).

07. The departmental appeal of the appellant as well as service appeal of the appellant were barred by time as he did not file the same during the prescribed period. We in this respect rely on a recent judgment of Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as 2023 SCMR 291 titled "Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala versus Khalid Mehmood and others" the relevant para is reproduced below:

"12. The law of limitation reduces an effect of extinguishment of a right of a party when significant lapses occur and when no sufficient cause for such lapses, delay or time barred action is shown by the defaulting party, the opposite party is entitled to a right accrued by such lapses. There is no relaxation in law affordable to approach the court of law after deep slumber or inordinate delay under the garb of labeling the order or action void with the articulation that no limitation runs against the void order. If such tendency is not deprecated and a party is allowed to approach the Court of law on his sweet will without taking care of the vital question of limitation, then the doctrine of finality cannot be achieved and everyone will move the Court at any point in time with the plea of void order. Even if the order is considered void, the aggrieved person should approach more cautiously rather than waiting for lapse of limitation and then

coming up with the plea of a void order which does not provide any premium of extending limitation period as a vested right or an inflexible rule. The intention of the provisions of the law of limitation is not to give a right where there is none, but to impose a bar after the specified period, authorizing a litigant to enforce his existing right within the period of limitation. The Court is obliged to independently advert to the question of limitation and determine the same and to take cognizance of delay without limitation having been set up as a defence by any party. The omission and negligence of not filing the proceedings within the prescribed limitation period creates a right in favour of the opposite party. In the case of Messrs. Blue Star Spinning Mills LTD -Vs. Collector of Sales Tax and others (2013 SCMR 587), this Court held that the concept that no limitation runs against a void order is not an inflexible rule; that a party cannot sleep over their right to challenge such an order and that it is bound to do so within the stipulated/prescribed period of limitation from the date of knowledge before the proper forum in appropriate proceedings. In the case of Muhammad Iftikhar Abbasi Vs. Mst. Naheed Begum and others (2022 SCMR 1074), it was held by this Court that the intelligence and perspicacity of the law of Limitation does not impart or divulge a right, but it commands an impediment for enforcing an existing right claimed and entreated after lapse of prescribed period of limitation when the claims are dissuaded by efflux of time. The litmus test is to get the drift of whether the party has vigilantly set the law in motion for the redress or remained indolent. While in the case of Khudadad Vs. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah @ S. Inaam Hussain and others (2022 SCMR 933), it was held that the objective and astuteness of the law of Limitation is not to confer a right, but it ordains and perpetrates an impediment after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right. In fact this law has been premeditated to dissuade the claims which have become stale by efflux of time. The litmus test therefore always is whether the party has vigilantly set the law in motion for redress. The Court under Section 3 of the Limitation Act is obligated independently rather as a primary duty to advert the question of limitation and make a decision, whether this question is raised by other party or not. The bar of limitation in an adversarial lawsuit brings forth valuable rights in favour of the other party. In the case of Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi Vs. Syed Rashid

Arshad and others (PLD 2015 SC 212), this Court held that the law of limitation requires that a person must approach the Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence, without dilatoriness and negligence and within the time provided by the law, as against choosing his own time for the purpose of bringing forth a legal action at his own whim and desire. Because if that is so permitted to happen, it shall not only result in the misuse of the judicial process of the State, but shall also cause exploitation of the legal system and the society as a whole. This is not permissible in a State which is governed by law and Constitution. It may be relevant to mention here that the law providing for limitation for various causes/reliefs is not a matter of mere technicality but foundationally of the "Law" itself."

08. In view of the above, instant service appeal, being barred by time, is dismissed with costs. Consign.

09. Pronounced in open Court at Peshawar and given under our hands and the seal of the Tribunal on this 1st day of October, 2024.



KALIM ARSHAD KHAN
Chairman



RASHIDA BANO
Member (Judicial)

Mutazem Shah